来源简介
arXiv:2610.26781v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermeasures impose no resource cost on perpetrators. Strategic scam-baiting, in which automated agents engage scammers to deplete their operational capacity, offers a proactive alternative but requires dynamic strategy adaptation that static systems cannot provide. We introduce a game-theoretic framework enabling LLMs to learn effective counter-strategies through in-context experience without fine-tuning. The framework models scammer-baiter interactions as a two-player game with empirically grounded strategies and utility functions, using Nash equilibrium as a formal benchmark for evaluating learned behaviour. Across 300 simulated dialogues and three LLM architectures, adaptive strategy selection achieves 28.9-79.7% closer alignment to Nash equilibrium than non-adaptive baselines. The code and an annotated dataset of 300 dialogues with turn-level strategy labels and utility scores are released at https://github.com/nardinebasta/GameofPhones_/ .
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采集于 2026/10/20 21:06:32（北京时间）。 arXiv 日期为本次公告时间，论文初次投稿日期请查看原文版本记录。